Did Marquis Outweigh Thomson On His Essay Why Abortion Is Immoral

The debate surrounding the morality of abortion is one of philosophy's most enduring and contentious issues. At its heart lie fundamental questions about personhood, moral status, and bodily autonomy. Two seminal papers that have profoundly shaped this discussion are Don Marquis's "Why Abortion Is Immoral" and Judith Jarvis Thomson's "A Defense of Abortion." While both authors engage with the ethical considerations of terminating a pregnancy, they arrive at starkly different conclusions, employing distinct argumentative strategies and philosophical frameworks. Marquis posits a strong argument against abortion based on the deprivation of a future life, whereas Thomson defends abortion rights through a focus on bodily autonomy, famously employing the violinist analogy. A careful examination of their respective arguments reveals significant divergences in their premises, methodologies, and ultimate implications for understanding the moral landscape of abortion.

Marquis's central thesis is that abortion is, in almost all cases, morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future. He argues that the wrongness of killing an adult human being lies primarily in the loss of the future experiences, projects, and enjoyments that person would have had. Applying this principle to fetuses, Marquis contends that a fetus possesses a potential future of great value, and therefore, killing it is morally equivalent to killing an adult. He carefully defines what constitutes a 'person' in a way that includes fetuses, thereby sidestepping the often-circular debates about when a fetus gains personhood. His argument is not based on the fetus being a 'person' in the sense of having rights or consciousness, but rather on the loss of a future that is like the future a person would have. This 'future-like-ours' argument aims to provide a robust, secular justification for the moral status of the fetus, independent of religious doctrines or contested definitions of consciousness or self-awareness. Marquis acknowledges potential objections, such as cases of rape or incest, or when the mother's life is at risk, but he maintains that these exceptions do not undermine the general principle that abortion is typically wrong.

In contrast, Judith Jarvis Thomson's "A Defense of Abortion" takes a radically different approach. Rather than focusing on the moral status of the fetus or its potential future, Thomson centers her argument on the right to bodily autonomy. She famously uses the thought experiment of a famous violinist who has a fatal kidney ailment and whose circulatory system is compatible with yours. The Society of Music Lovers kidnaps you and plugs you into the violinist's circulatory system so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood. He will be dead in nine months, and if you unplug him now, he will die. Thomson asks: do you have to stay plugged in? She argues that you do not, because you have a right to control your own body, and the violinist's right to life does not entail the right to use your body against your will. This analogy is extended to the case of pregnancy resulting from rape, suggesting that even if the fetus has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant person's body without their consent. Thomson's argument is not about whether the fetus is a person or has a future, but about the permissibility of terminating a pregnancy when it infringes upon the pregnant individual's fundamental right to control their own body. She distinguishes between the right to life and the right to the use of another person's body, asserting that the latter is not guaranteed by the former.

Comparing these two influential arguments highlights fundamental disagreements in moral philosophy. Marquis's strength lies in its attempt to provide a unified theory of the wrongness of killing, extending it consistently from adults to fetuses. His argument appeals to our intuition that a future life is valuable and that prematurely ending it is a grave harm. It offers a clear, if controversial, criterion for moral status that avoids the complexities of defining consciousness or personhood. However, a significant weakness is its potential to lead to counterintuitive conclusions. If the 'future-like-ours' argument is applied consistently, it could imply that contraception is also morally problematic, as it prevents a future person from coming into existence. Furthermore, it doesn't adequately address the profound moral weight of the pregnant person's autonomy and well-being, potentially reducing their agency to a mere vessel. The argument also struggles with cases where the fetus has severe abnormalities or would have a future filled with suffering, questions Marquis touches upon but doesn't fully resolve within his core framework.

Thomson's argument, conversely, excels in its powerful defense of individual autonomy and its ability to capture the moral intuition that no one should be forced to sustain another's life at the cost of their own bodily integrity. The violinist analogy, while controversial, effectively illustrates the distinction between a right to life and a right to the use of another's body. Her work is particularly compelling in cases of unwanted pregnancy, especially those resulting from rape, where the claim of bodily autonomy is exceptionally strong. However, Thomson's argument faces its own challenges. Critics argue that the analogy between a pregnant person and the unwilling host to the violinist is imperfect. A fetus, unlike the violinist, is not an external entity being imposed upon the person; it is a developing organism intrinsically connected to the pregnant person's body. Furthermore, Thomson's argument seems less equipped to address pregnancies that result from consensual intercourse, where the claim of bodily autonomy might be seen as more complexly balanced against the potential life of the fetus. Her focus on autonomy, while crucial, can sometimes appear to sideline considerations about the fetus's potential or its status as a developing human organism.

Ultimately, the question of whether Marquis outweighs Thomson hinges on which philosophical considerations one prioritizes. If the primary moral concern is the prevention of the loss of a valuable future, then Marquis's argument carries significant weight. It offers a principled reason to view abortion as a serious moral wrong. However, if the paramount concern is bodily autonomy and the right of individuals to control their own lives and bodies, then Thomson's argument is more persuasive. Her work highlights the profound implications of unwanted pregnancy for personal liberty and self-determination. Many find Thomson's defense more compelling because it directly addresses the lived experience and fundamental rights of the pregnant individual, which are often overlooked in discussions that focus solely on the fetus. While Marquis provides a strong case against abortion based on potentiality, Thomson's argument resonates more powerfully with the ethical imperative to respect individual autonomy, particularly in situations where pregnancy imposes significant burdens and infringes upon fundamental rights. The ongoing dialogue between these perspectives underscores the complexity of abortion ethics, where deeply held intuitions about potential life and individual liberty often clash.