An Issue Of Descartess Meditations

René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy stands as a cornerstone of modern Western thought, famously initiating a radical project of doubt to establish certain knowledge. Among the many intricate arguments presented, the transition from the certainty of the thinking self ('cogito ergo sum') to the existence of God and, subsequently, the external world presents a particularly fertile ground for critical examination. This essay will focus on the argument for God's existence as presented in the Third Meditation, specifically examining whether Descartes successfully bridges the gap between the idea of a perfect being and the actual existence of such a being, and the implications of this argument's perceived weaknesses for his overall project of foundationalism.

Descartes begins the Third Meditation by surveying his own thoughts, categorizing them into ideas, volitions, and judgments. He establishes that while he can err in his judgments, the ideas themselves, as mental representations, possess a certain objective reality. The crucial step in his argument for God's existence lies in his application of the principle that the cause must be at least as real as its effect. He notes that he possesses the idea of a supremely perfect being – infinite, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and supremely good. He argues that this idea could not have originated from himself, for he is an imperfect, finite being. If he were the author of this idea, he would have had to create himself, and thus would have endowed himself with all the perfections contained in the idea of God. Since he is clearly not perfect, he cannot be the source of this idea. Therefore, the idea of a perfect being must have been placed in his mind by a being that is, in fact, supremely perfect – God himself.

This argument, often termed the 'ontological argument' in its later formulations, relies heavily on the principle of causality and the nature of ideas. Descartes asserts that the objective reality of an idea – its representational content – must have a cause that possesses at least as much formal reality (actual existence) as the objective reality of the idea. The idea of God, with its infinite objective reality, demands a cause with infinite formal reality. Since only an infinite and perfect being possesses such formal reality, God must be the cause of the idea of God in Descartes' mind. He further bolsters this by arguing that the very concept of God includes existence; a perfect being, by definition, must possess all perfections, and existence is a perfection. Thus, the idea of God inherently implies God's existence.

However, critics have long questioned the validity of this inferential leap. A prominent objection, famously articulated by Antoine Arnauld and later echoed by Immanuel Kant, concerns the nature of existence itself. Is existence a predicate or a property that can be predicated of a subject, much like 'blue' is a predicate of 'sky'? Kant argued that existence is not a real predicate; it does not add anything to the concept of a thing but merely posits the thing with all its predicates. If existence is not a property that can be contained within a concept, then the argument that God, as a perfect being, must possess existence as a perfection falters. The concept of a hundred thalers, for instance, contains no inherent property of 'being in my pocket'; the concept is the same whether the thalers exist or not. Similarly, the concept of a perfect being might be coherent, but this coherence does not guarantee its instantiation in reality.

Another point of contention lies in the principle of causality as applied to ideas. Descartes assumes that an idea, as a representation, must have a cause that is ontologically superior to it. While this holds true for material causes (e.g., a statue cannot be more real than the sculptor's skill or the marble), its application to mental content is less intuitive. Can an idea of perfection truly necessitate an external, perfect cause, or could it be a product of the mind's capacity for abstraction, negation, or even a misapprehension of finitude? Descartes dismisses the possibility that the idea of perfection arises from a negation of imperfection, arguing that one must first have a positive idea of perfection to recognize something as imperfect. Yet, the mind's ability to conceive of extremes and infinities through a process of extrapolation from finite experiences remains a persistent challenge to his argument.

If the argument for God's existence, as presented in the Third Meditation, is indeed flawed, the subsequent steps in Descartes' philosophical system become precarious. The certainty of the external world, established in the Fifth and Sixth Meditations, relies on the premise that God, being perfect, would not deceive us. If God's existence cannot be rigorously proven, then the guarantee against deception, and thus the certainty of our senses and the material world, is undermined. The entire edifice of Cartesian knowledge, built upon the foundation of indubitable truths, risks collapsing if its cornerstone – the proof of a non-deceiving God – proves unstable.

In conclusion, while Descartes' argument for God's existence in the Third Meditation is a sophisticated attempt to move from the certainty of the self to the certainty of God, it faces significant philosophical hurdles. The nature of existence as a predicate and the applicability of causality to mental ideas are points where his reasoning can be challenged. The enduring debate surrounding these arguments highlights the difficulty of establishing foundational truths and underscores the profound impact of Descartes' attempt to do so, even if the success of his specific proofs remains a subject of ongoing philosophical inquiry.